The carbon bubble : climate policy in a fire-sale model of deleveraging by Comerford, David & Spiganti, Alessandro
Comerford, David and Spiganti, Alessandro (2016) The carbon bubble : 
climate policy in a fire-sale model of deleveraging. In: Central Banking, 
Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability, 2016-11-14, Bank of 
England. (Unpublished) , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/61199/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
The Carbon Bubble
Climate Policy in a Fire Sale Model of Deleveraging
David Comerford§ Alessandro Spiganti†
§Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde
†University of Edinburgh
Workshop on
Central Banking, Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability
Bank of England, November 2016
Table of contents
Introduction
Model
Calibration
Policies
Introduction
◮ In 1996, EU Governments set a global temperature target of 2◦C above
pre-industrial level, confirmed by subsequent climate agreements e.g. IPCC (2014)
◮ Meeting this target is much more closely related to cumulative carbon emissions
rather than rates of emission
◮ ⇒ a “carbon budget” of allowable emissions, of ∼ 20%− 50% of current reserves,
whilst the rest is “unburnable carbon”
◮ But capital markets positively value fossil fuel reserves
◮ Stranded assets → reduced market values
◮ Reduced value of collateral → breakdown of credit relationships
◮ No credit → less investment in alternative energy infrastructure
◮ Issue first raised by Carbon Tracker Initiative (2011) and subsequently highlighted
by Bank of England, Carney (2014)
In this paper
◮ What we do
◮ We address the implications of climate policy upon macroeconomic stability
◮ Given frictional financial markets, climate policy can induce a depression with
consequent negative impacts upon welfare and alternative energy infrastructure
investment
◮ We examine macroeconomic policy responses that can mitigate the effects of
implementing climate policy
◮ How we do it
◮ Dynamic simulations
◮ Using an augmented macroeconomic model with financial frictions
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004)
◮ In which we impose a cumulative carbon emissions limit
Allen et al. (2009)
Findings
◮ Welfare (= PV (NNP)) seems to be related to investment in alternative energy
infrastructure over period while still have fossil fuels available
◮ Both are maximised using policy. Various policies are analysed and all these
policies have value in the model.
◮ A sudden “bursting of the carbon bubble” without any offsetting policy is likely to
be sub-optimal. The policy response to climate change must pay cognisance to
the impact that it will have on investors’ balance sheets.
The Model
Extension of Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) full Credit Cycles model
◮ Discrete and infinite time
◮ 3 goods
◮ investment goods, ZH and ZL, depreciating at rate 1− λ
interpret as carbon emitting and zero carbon energy infrastructure respectively
◮ durable asset K , no depreciation, fixed aggregate amount K¯
interpret as other capital
◮ non durable commodity, can be consumed or invested. One unit of energy
infrastructure costs φ units of commodity
◮ 2 competitive markets
◮ asset: 1 unit of the durable asset is exchanged for qt units of the commodity
◮ credit: 1 unit of the commodity at date t is exchanged for Rt units of the
commodity at date t + 1
Agents
2 types of risk-neutral agents
◮ mass 1 of entrepreneurs → max
{xs}
Et
[∑∞
s=t β
s−txs
]
◮ mass m of savers → max
{x ′s}
Et
[∑∞
s=t β
′s−tx ′s
]
Assumption A: β < β′ i.e. savers are relatively patient
◮ Savers use a decreasing returns to scale technology
y ′t = Ψ(k
′
t−1) = (K¯ − ν)k
′
t−1 −
1
2
m(k ′t−1)
2 + Const
◮ In equilibrium, savers are unconstrained and entrepreneurs will be credit
constrained. ⇒ savers’ discount factor determines market interest rate i.e.
Rt = R = 1/β
′
Entrepreneurs
◮ Real output: two possible Leontief technologies
Leontief assumption is straight from Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), but Hassler et al. (2012) suggests energy inputs and other factors of
production have extremely low elasticity of substitution, at least in short run.
Fi(kt−1, z
i
t−1) = (a
i + c)×min(kt−1, z
i
t−1) i = {L,H}
◮ Private return
yH(kt−1, z
H
t−1) = (a
H − τ + c)min(kt−1, z
H
t−1)
yL(kt−1, z
L
t−1) = (a
L + δς + c)min(kt−1, z
L
t−1)
◮ where:
◮ Assumption B: aH > aL
◮ c ≡ untradeable output which must be consumed
◮ τ ≡ carbon tax, ς ≡ zero carbon subsidy
◮ 0 < δ < 1 ≡ subsidy induced distortion
Credit constraints ⇒ sub-optimally low capital. A subsidy therefore moves economy towards first best. Want optimal zero subsidy in
steady state, so introduce productivity destroying distortion.
Budget constraints
Financial Accelerator
◮ Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) uses only fixed capital as collateral, so entrepreneurs
face a borrowing constraint
bt ≤
qt+1kt
R
◮ This leads to an equation of motion for capital used by entrepreneurs that exhibits
a financial accelerator
kt =
1
qt + φ−
qt+1
R
[
(qt + λφ+ a)kt−1 − Rbt−1 + gt
]
where a = aH − τ = aL + δς (i.e. policy here is such that entrepreneurs are
indifferent w.r.t. technology).
◮ At the end of period t, the net worth of an entrepreneur is given by the expression
in the square brackets.
◮ A proportional increase in both qt and qt+1 raises demand for capital. A rise in qt
increases entrepreneur net worth and a rise in qt+1 strengthens the value of
collateral, outweighing price-increase induced reductions in demand.
Aggregate Equations of Motion Mkt Clearing Assumptions
◮ Capital in entrepreneurial sector,
Kt = (1− π)λKt−1 +
π
qt + φ−
qt+1
R
×
[(
qt + φλ+ a
)
Kt−1 − RBt−1 +
γtτ − (1− γt)ς
1 + m
Kt−1
]
◮ Where γt ≡ share of entrepreneurs using z
H at t, and
π ≡ share of entrepreneurs able to invest each period.
◮ Debt held by entrepreneurial sector,
Bt = qt(Kt − Kt−1) + φ(Kt − λKt−1) + RBt−1 − aKt−1
−
γtτ − (1− γt)ς
1 + m
Kt−1
◮ Capital price, qt =
qt+1
R
+ Kt − ν
Steady State Equilibria
There exists a continuum of steady state equilibria, (q⋆, K ⋆, B⋆), indexed by γ ∈ [0, 1]
and a ∈ [aL, aH ], where
B⋆ =
φλ− φ+ a + γτ−(1−γ)ς1+m
R − 1
K ⋆
K ⋆ =
R − 1
R
q⋆ + ν
q⋆ =
R
R − 1
π
(
a + γτ−(1−γ)ς1+m
)
− φ(1− λ)(1− R + Rπ)
πλ+ (1− λ)(1− R + Rπ)
Implication: SS zero carbon investment can be higher if allow high carbon
investment
Calibration
◮ β = β′ − ǫ for infinitesimal ǫ > 0 chosen so that PV (NNI) is social welfare
function
◮ R & λ chosen so that periods interpreted as quarters
◮ Const chosen to equalise steady state consumption of individual savers and
entrepreneurs
◮ aH = 1 normalisation, and δ chosen so that optimal steady state subsidy is zero
(i.e. a = aL and τ = aH − aL)
◮ Current energy mix suggests γ0 = 0.8 and a
L = 0.9
◮ Use initial carbon emitting energy infrastructure value = 4.5% of total global
capital value as calibration target
loosely based on Dietz et al. (2016) and EIA (2016)
◮ For 2oC target, Carbon Tracker Initiative (2013): up to “80% of listed companies’
current reserves cannot be burnt”, IEA (2012): “no more than one-third of proven
reserves of fossil fuels can be consumed”. In value terms, assume 50% of initial
carbon emitting energy infrastructure can be used.
Calibration
◮ i.e. Carbon Bubble will be modelled as the write off (implemented using λH < λ)
of carbon emitting energy infrastructure representing 2.25% of total global capital
value.
◮ The Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was triggered by loss of value associated with
sub-prime mortgage assets. These had value of perhaps 0.9% of total global
capital value (Hellwig (2009))
◮ Use the Financial Crisis, modelled in the same way as Carbon Bubble, as
calibration target
◮ This 0.9% value write off precipitated dynamics in which global output fell 6%
below trend, and global asset values fell by around 20%
◮ This allows us to generate a calibration for the model
Parameters
Dynamic Simulations Algorithm Default
◮ At t = 0, social planner
◮ privately observes total carbon budget, S¯ = 50%× S0 =
0.5γK0
1−λ
◮ forbids high-carbon investment
◮ Policy instruments (analysed separately)
◮ planner takes some share of entrepreneurs’ debt, ω, funded through lump sum taxes,
τG , i.e. B′0+ = (1− ω)B0+ and B
G
0 = ωB0+, where B
G
t = (1 + m)τ
G β
1−β (1− β
25−t)
◮ planner implements a zero carbon subsidy, ς0 > 0, ςt = max (0, ς0 × (25− t)/25)
◮ planner announces some carbon budget Sˆ > S¯
No Policy
Tax-Funded Transfer of Entrepreneur’s Debt
Optimal ω is 90%⇒ +5.2% welfare (entrepreneurs +73%, savers −11%), &
cumulative IL over 200 periods is +50%. NB optimal ω without Carbon Bubble is
60%⇒ +0.6% welfare.
Subsidy
Optimal ς0 is 45%× a
L ⇒ +3% welfare (entrepreneurs +49%, savers −7%), &
cumulative IL over 200 periods is +40%.
Deception
Optimal Sˆ is 72%× S0 ⇒ +2% welfare (entrepreneurs +17%, savers +0%), &
cumulative IL over 200 periods is +12%.
Conclusions
◮ Carbon Bubble introduced by Carbon Tracker Initiative (2011) as warning to
investors: protect your portfolio
◮ We incorporate Carbon Bubble in macro-financial model ⇒ go beyond this
warning to investors and consider appropriate macroeconomic policy to
accompany Carbon Bubble
◮ ⇒ cannot ignore balance sheet effects of writing off high carbon assets on
investment in zero carbon replacement infrastructure
◮ Without policy, full “bursting of the carbon bubble” could lead to deep recession,
depriving green technology of investment when it’s most needed, and causing
large welfare losses
◮ Macroeconomic policy likely effective, and must pay cognisance to the impact
that climate policy will have on investors’ balance sheets
Thank you!
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Appendix: Budget Constraints
For an entrepreneur using capital together with carbon emitting energy infrastructure
qt(kt − kt−1) + φ(kt − λkt−1) + Rbt−1 + (xt − ckt−1) + τkt−1
= aHkt−1 + bt + gt
For capital used together with zero-carbon energy infrastructure
qt(kt − kt−1) + φ(kt − λkt−1) + Rbt−1 + (xt − ckt−1)
= aLkt−1 + δςkt−1 + bt + gt
For savers
qt(k
′
t − k
′
t−1) + Rb
′
t−1 + x
′
t = Ψ(k
′
t−1) + b
′
t + gt
For the government
τγKt − ς(1− γt)Kt = (1 + m)gt
Back
Appendix: Market Clearing Conditions
◮ Market Clearing Conditions
Kt + K
′
t = K¯ (1a)
Bt + B
′
t = 0 (1b)
Xt + I
H
t + I
L
t + X
′
t = Yt + Y
′
t (1c)
Back
Appendix: Assumptions
◮ Ψ′
(
K¯
m
)
<
π
(
aL+ γτ
1+m
)
−φ(1−λ)(1+Rπ−R)
πλ+(1−λ)(1−R+Rπ) < Ψ
′(0)
◮ aH > aL > (1− λ)φ
◮ π > R−1
R
◮ c > 1−βRλ(1−π)
βR[πλ+(1−λ)(1−R+Rπ)]
(
1
β
− 1
)
(aL + λφ)
◮ lim
s→∞
Et(R
−sqt+s) = 0
Back
Appendix: I⋆L
◮ ILt = (1− γ)φ(Kt − λKt−1)
◮ In steady state:
IL⋆ = (1− γ)φ(1− λ)K ⋆
= (1− γ)φ(1− λ)×{
π
[
a + γτ−(1−γ)ς1+m
]
− φ(1− λ)(1− R + Rπ)
πλ+ (1− λ)(1− R + Rπ)
+ ν
}
Back
Appendix: Possibility of Default
◮ Non-existence of solution for large negative shock in KM
◮ Allow entrepreneurs to default
◮ In KM, the shock hits the economy once the farmers have already taken their
labor input decisions
◮ even if tradable output is not collaterizable, debt repayments can be collected
against both assets and output
◮ farmers always choose to honor their debt completely
◮ Here, entrepreneurs already know the value of the shock before they had input
labor
◮ after a negative shock, the value of the debt is above the net worth of the collateral
and, given that default is costless, entrepreneurs always have the incentive to
renegotiate
Back
Appendix: Shooting Algorithm Back
◮ By combining the laws of motion together with the land market equilibrium
condition, we can find (Kt ,Bt , qt+1) as function of (Kt−1,Bt−1, qt)
◮ qt+1 = R(qt − u(Kt)) = R(qt − Kt + ν)
◮ System of “transition equations” than we can iterate
◮ When the shock hits, land price jumps in response to the shock and entrepreneurs
experience a loss on their landholdings
◮ But for large T , qT = q
⋆
◮ Guess the initial variation in land price given the shock and then iterate the
economy forward through time to see if it converges again to the steady state
◮ If the level of land price eventually explodes, the initial guess is revised downward
◮ If it is forever smaller then the initial guess is revised upward
◮ “Guess and check” procedure is repeated until the land price is close to the steady
state
Appendix: Parameters
Parameters Values
R 1.01 λ 0.975 π 0.015 ν 0.225
K¯ 5.26 φ 24 aH 1 aL 0.9
γ0 0.8 m 2.71 c 0.9 Const 3.90
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